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Abstract—One of the most terrifying phenomenon nowadays is
the DeepFake: the possibility to automatically replace a person’s
face in images and videos by exploiting algorithms based on deep
learning. This paper will present a brief overview of technologies
able to produce DeepFake images of faces. A forensics analysis
of those images with standard methods will be presented: not
surprisingly state of the art techniques are not completely able
to detect the fakeness. To solve this, a preliminary idea on how
to fight DeepFake images of faces will be presented by analysing
anomalies in the frequency domain.
Index Terms—DeepFake, Multimedia Forensics, Generative
Adversarial Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence technologies are evolving so rapidly
that unthinkable new applications and services have emerged:
one of them is the DeepFake. DeepFakes refers to all those
multimedia contents synthetically altered or created by ex-
ploiting machine learning generative models. DeepFakes are
image, audio or video contents that appear extremely realistic
to humans specifically when they are used to generate and/or
alter/swap image of faces. Various examples of DeepFake,
involving celebrities, have already be seen on the internet:
the insertion of Nicholas Cage1 in movies where he did not
act like “Fight Club” and “The Matrix” or the impressive
video in which Jim Carrey2 plays Shining in place of Jack
Nicholson. Other more worrying examples are the video of
Obama (Figure 1(a)), created by Buzzfeed3 in collaboration
with Monkeypaw Studios, or the video in which Mark Zucker-
berg4 (Figure 1(b)) claims a series of statements about the
platform’s ability to steal its users’ data.
These Deepfakes have already been spread by mass media,
also in Italy, where the satirical tv program “Striscia La
Notizia5, broadcasted in September 2019 a video of the ex-
premier Matteo Renzi talking about his colleagues in a “not so
respectful way (Figure 1 (c)). As we can imagine, DeepFakes
may have serious repercussions on the veracity of the news
spread by the mass media while representing a new threat for
politics, companies and personal privacy.
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yQxsIWO2ic
2https://www.youtube.com/Jim-Carrey
3 https://www.youtube.com/Obama
4https://www.youtube.com/Mark-Zuckerberg
5https://www.striscialanotizia.mediaset.it/Matteo-Renzi
Fig. 1. Several examples of DeepFake: (a) Obama, created by Buzzfeed
in collaboration with Monkeypaw Studios; (b) Mark Zuckerberg, created by
artists Bill Posters and Daniel Howe in partnership with advertising company
Canny; (c) Matteo Renzi, created by “Striscia la Notizia.
Deepfakes are evolving quickly and are becoming dan-
gerous, not just for the reputation of the victims but also
for security. In this dangerous scenario, tools are needed to
unmask the deepfakes detect them or, at least, to mitigate the
potential harm and abuse that can be done be means of these
multimedia contents.
Several big companies, from Facebook to Microsoft, have
decided to take action against this phenomenon: Google has
created a database of fake videos [44] to support researchers
who are developing new methods to detect them while Face-
book and Microsoft have launched the Deepfake Detection
Challenge initiative6 which invites people from all over the
world to create new tools to detect deepfakes and manipulated
media.
The motivation of this paper is straightforward, after a
brief overview of the state of the art in order to better
understand what the technologies able to produce Deepfake
are, a preliminary forensics analysis will be carried out. A first
contribution to the field will be demonstrating that it is possible
for the image forensics expert to find anomalies that could be
6https://deepfakedetectionchallenge.ai/
Fig. 2. Simple schematic view of a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN):
the purpose of the Generator is to produce new data, while the Discriminator
learns how to distinguish real data from artificially generated one.
related to how the Deepfake image is made. In fact standard
image forensics tools are able to highlight some anomalies
which the expert can analyze in deep to find specific anomalies
in the frequency domain. In particular the anomalies, after
Fourier transform, will be shown and will make clear that each
kind of DeepFake creation technology has an easily detectable
pattern. These evidence - as a preliminary result to the field -
could lead to further and more sophisticated (even automatic)
detection and analysis techniques.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follow. Sec-
tion II presents an overview of DeepFake creation technolo-
gies. Section III investigates how Image Forensics can fights
DeepFakes. The proposed method is described in Section IV.
Section V concludes the paper with the explanation of our
future goal in this field.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DEEPFAKE CREATION
TECHNOLOGIES
A. Introduction to GAN
Synthetic audiovisual media can be generated with a variety
of techniques. Currently, the most popular of these techniques
is the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) due to its flex-
ible applications and realistic outputs. Generative adversarial
networks (GANs) were firstly introduced by Ian Goodfellow
[20] in 2014. They propose a new framework for estimating
generative models via an adversarial process, in which we
simultaneously train two models: a generative model G that
captures the data distribution, and a discriminative model D
able to estimate the probability that a sample came from
the training data rather than G. The training procedure for
G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake.
This framework corresponds to a min-max two-player game
(Figure 2). In the case of Deepfakes, the G can be thought
as a team of counterfeiters trying to produce fake currency,
while the D stands to the police, trying to detect the malicious
activity. G and D can be made by any kind of generative
model, in the original version they are implemented through
deep neural networks.
There are many types of models proposed in the literature
[27], [41], [52], [55]. Architecture variant GANs are mainly
proposed for the purpose of different applications e.g., image
completion [26], image super resolution [33], text-to-image
generation [43] and image to image transfer [55]. The original
GAN paper [20] employed fully-connected neural networks
for both generator and discriminator. Laplacian Pyramid of
Adversarial Networks is proposed for the production of higher
resolution images from lower resolution input GAN [15].
Deep Convolutional GAN is the first work where a deconvolu-
tional neural networks architecture [51] is applied. Boundary
Equilibrium GAN uses an autoencoder architecture for the
discriminator which was first proposed in [54]. Progressive
GAN involves progressive steps toward the expansion of the
network architecture [27]. This architecture uses the idea of
progressive neural networks first proposed in [45]. BigGAN [8]
has also achieved state-of-the-art performance on the Ima-
geNet datasets.
B. Technologies for image creation
Focusing on DeepFake images of face, in [30] Lample et
al. an “encoder-decoder architecture, (Fader Networks), able
to generate different realistic versions of an input image by
varying the values of the attributes was introduces: given
an input image x with its attributes y, the encoder maps x
to a latent representation z, and the decoder is trained to
reconstruct x given (z, y). At inference time, a test image is
encoded in the latent space and the user chooses the values of
the attributes y that are sent to the decoder. A classifier learns
how to predict the y attributes given the latent representation
z during training. The encoder-decoder is trained so that
the latent representation z must contain enough sufficients
information to allow inputs reconstruction while the latent
representation must prevent the classifier from predicting the
correct attribute values. The authors have trained and tested
Fader Network considering the CelebA dataset [35], obtaining
a model that can significantly change the perceived value of
the attributes while preserving the natural appearance of the
input images. Tests have also been carried out on the Oxford-
102 dataset [39] (containing about 9, 000 images of flowers
classified in 102 categories), by changing the colour of the
flower while keeping the background unchanged. Excellent
results have also been achieved in this test. The code is
available at https://github.com/FaderNetworks.
In [46], Shen et al. a novel method based on residual
image learning for face attribute manipulation is proposed.
It can model the manipulation operation, as learning the
residual image, defined as the difference between the original
input image and the desired manipulated one. The proposed
work focuses on the attribute-specific face area instead of
the entire face which contains many redundant and irrelevant
details. They develop a dual scheme able to learn two inverse
attribute manipulations (one as the primal manipulation and
the other as the dual manipulation) simultaneously. For each
face attribute manipulation there are two image transformation
networks called G0 and G1 and a discriminative network D.
G0 and G1 that respectively simulate the primal and the dual
manipulation. D classifies the reference images and generated
images into three categories.
Several DeepFake based techniques that are present at the
state of the art are limited regarding the management of more
than two domains (for example, to change hair color, gender,
age, and many others features in a face), since they should
generate different models for each pair of image domains. A
method capable of performing image-to-image translations on
multiple domains using a single model has been proposed by
Choi et al. [11] by means of a technology called StarGAN,
a generative adversarial network. The main purpose was to
define a scalable image-to-image translation model across mul-
tiple domains using a single generator and a discriminator. The
authors used two different types of face datasets: CelebA [35]
and RaFD dataset [31] Given a random label (for example hair
color, facial expression, etc) as input, the network is able to
perform an image-to-image translation operation considering
the given label. The results have been compared with other
existing methods [34], [40], [55] and show how StarGAN
manages to generate images of superior visual quality. The
code is available at https://github.com/stargan.
Wang et al. [50] propose Identity-Preserved Conditional
Generative Adversarial Networks (IPCGAN), a framework for
facial aging. IPCGAN is composed of three parts: a CGANs
module (takes an input image and a target age to generate
a new face with that age), an identity-preserved module
(guarantees the aged face has the same input identity) and
an age classifier (to ensure that the output has the desired
age). The authors considered faces with different ages divided
into 5 groups: 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50 and 50+. Given
an image of the face x, they use the Cs information to
indicate the age group to which x belongs. The aging of a
face aims to generate a synthesized face of the target age
group Ct. The framework has been trained and tested using
the Cross-Age Celebrity Dataset (CACD) [9]. The perfor-
mances of IPCGAN have been compared with acGAN [2] and
CAAE [53] which achieve performance at vanguard for aging
of the face. The qualitative and quantitative tests show that
IPCGAN achieves the best results. Finally, IPCGAN can also
be used to perform multi-attribute transfer tasks. The code is
available at https://github.com/IPCGAN.
The Style Generative Adversarial Network, or Style-
GAN [28], proposes large changes to the generator model,
including the use of a mapping network to map points in latent
space to an intermediate latent space, to control style at each
point in the generator model, and the introduction to noise as
a source of variation at each point in the generator model. The
resulting model is capable not only of generating impressively
photorealistic high-quality photos of faces, but also offers
control over the style of the generated image at different
levels of detail through varying the style vectors and noise.
In December 2018, the visual computing company NVIDIA,
released an open source code for photorealistic face generation
software created thanks to the StyleGAN algorithm [28].
Then, Uber’s computer engineer Phillip Wang created the
website https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/ and then on 11
February 2019 published it on the public group Facebook
Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning. StyleGAN algo-
rithm is to be able to create realistic pseudo-portraits, difficult
to judge as fakes. StyleGAN has also difficulty with the
definition of the teeth and it cannot identify the backgrounds.
Furthermore, there are often fluorescent spots, similar to
water drops, which can appear anywhere on the image. To
correct those imperfections in StyleGAN, Karras et al. made
some improvements to the generator (including re-designed
normalization, multi-resolution, and regularization methods)
proposing StyleGAN2 [29].
III. FIGHTING DEEPFAKES WITH IMAGE FORENSICS
Image forgery and alteration is not a new problem intro-
duced by DeepFakes. Counterfeiting an image with image
editing tools like Photoshop is still very common as today
and the image/multimedia forensics science as already dealt
with the problem [4]. There are several techniques that try
to understand if a multimedia content is fake by means of
various strategies to detect anomalies in the hidden structure
of the multimedia content itself, exploiting noise, compression
parameters, etc. Some try to reconstruct the history of the
image [19] to identify the source-acquiring device or software,
others instead analyze anomalies in the compressed JPEG
domain [5], [18], [17] like Galvan et al. [17] who proposed
a method which is able to recover the coefficients of the first
compression process in a double compressed JPEG image to
verify if there are altered elements. Another example from
Battiato et al. [5] exploits the statistical distribution of the DCT
coefficients in order to detect irregularities due to the presence
of a signal overlapped on the original image. More recently,
Giudice et al. [18] proposed a new analysis that can be carried
out in the DCT domain able to automatically classify doubly
compressed JPEG images with extremely high precision, giv-
ing forensics experts a tool to find the first evidence of image
alteration. Not only the hidden structure of the image can be
useful fakeness analysis. Even if the DeepFake images are
extremely realistic, the visible contents could be analysed in
order to find anomalies useful for detection.
In this context, Marra et al. [37] discussed the performance
of various image-to-image translations detectors, both in ideal
conditions and in the presence of compression, performed at
the time of uploading to social networks. The study, conducted
on a dataset of 36.302 images, shows that it is possible to
obtain detection accuracy up to 95% both with conventional
detectors and with deep learning based detectors, but only
the latter continue to provide high accuracy, up to 89%, on
compressed data.
Hsu et al. [25] also proposed an interesting method
for detecting Deepfakes, called Deep Forgery Discriminator
(DeepFD). Thanks to the implementation of a new discrimi-
nator that uses “contrastive loss it is possible to find the typical
characteristics of the synthesized images generated by different
GANs and therefore use a classifier to detect such fake images.
For the training phase they used the CelebA dataset [35],
considering 5 state-of-the-art GANs to generate the pool of
false images [3], [23], [27], [36], [41]. Using the DeepFD
they detected 94.7% of fake images generated by numerous
state-of-the-art GANs, exceeding the other basic approaches
present in the state of the art in terms of precision and recall
rates. The code is available at https://github.com/DeepFD.
Fig. 3. Example of Analysis carried out with Amped Authenticate software. (a) Image generated by STYLEGAN. (b) Image generated by STARGAN. In
both examples we show only some of the elements analyzed with Amped Authenticate, such as the analyzed different color spaces to understand if anomalies
are found; ELA (Error Level Analysis) for Identification of spliced areas of the image that have been compressed differently; Correlation map to analyze and
identify the correlation between the pixels of the image; Clones Keypoints to find parts of the image that appear to be cloned.
As described by Guarnera et al. [21], the current GAN
architectures that create Deepfake images, through convolution
layers, leaves a fingerprint that characterizes that specific
neural architecture. In order to capture this forensic trace, the
authors used the Expectation-Maximization Algortihm [38]
obtaining features able to distinguish real images [35] from
Deepfake images [10], [11], [24], [28], [29]. The performed
experiments delivered excellent results. obtaining excellent
results7 (with accuracy over 90%).
Bonettini et al [7]. exploits Benford’s law with the aim of
identifying and analyzing statistical traces in order to detect if
an image was generated by a generic GAN architecture. The
authors verify that Benford’s law is not followed by GAN
images and have proposed a number of related features to
detect images generated by CycleGAN [55] and ProGAN [27].
From the conducted experiments, good detection results were
obtained using a Random Forest classifier.
Wang et al. [49] investigated the possibility to create an
universal detector able to identify the real images generated
by a CNN regardless of the architecture or dataset used. They
trained a classifier on a single CNN generator (ProGAN [27]).
The conducted experiments demonstrated that this classifier
detects synthesized images generated by different architectures
and is also robust to JPEG compression, spatial blurring and
scaling.
Next to images, there are some specific techniques for
videos which are try to dene if they are DeepFake. A video
based DeepFake Detection method is described in the work of
Gera et al. [22]. The authors used a CNN to extract frame-level
features. In particular they use a Recurrent neural network
(RNN) to train a classifier able to recognise if the video
was manipulated or not by evaluating temporal inconsistencies
introduced between the frames where face is modied. They
evaluated the method with 600 videos: 300 fakes found on the
web, 300 of real scenes taken from the HOHA dataset [32].
7https://iplab.dmi.unict.it/mfs/DeepFake/
From experiments carried out by the authors, they get 97%
accurate for fake detection.
Finally, Rossler et al. [44] propose an automated benchmark
for fake detection, based mainly on four manipulation meth-
ods: two computer graphics-based methods (Face2Face [48],
FaceSwap8) and 2 learning-based approaches (Deepfakes9,
NeuralTextures [47]). The authors addressed the problem of
fake detection as a binary classification for each frame of
manipulated videos, considering different techniques present
in the state of the art [1], [6], [12], [13], [16], [42].
A face tracking method is initially applied to the input
image [48] (so as to work only on that particular region)
to switch to the classification methods. The experiments con-
ducted show that XceptionNet achieves the best results. They
also tested XceptionNet with images without face tracking
information. In this case, however, the XceptionNet classifier
has significantly lower accuracy. The code is available at
https://github.com/ondyari/FaceForensics.
Fighting DeepFakes with Deep Neural Network techniques
have already been demonstrated good performances, both in
images and video. But what are the evidences found by those
techniques, namely explaining why they classify an image as
DeepFake, is still not completely known. All the listed-above
studies deal with images and videos created by GANs without
any other processing. Marra et al. [37] already showed that
JPEG compression could lead to loss of accuracy of detection
techniques. Given this, a complete analysis that exploits Deep
Neural Network detectors in conjunction with standard (and of
today) manual image forensics analysis techniques could lead
to a solution of the problem. To this aim, a detailed image
forensics analysis will be presented in the next Section.
IV. DEEPFAKE FORENSICS ANALYSIS
In the previous paragraphs the most accurate techniques
used nowadays to create DeepFake were described, and there-
8https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
9https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap/
Fig. 4. Examples of analyzed images generated by (a) STARGAN and (b)
STYLEGAN. Each image I of both datasets was converted to grayscale (1)
and applied progressively: the Median filter (2), the Laplacian filter (3), the
Laplacian filter (4) applied to the result of (2), the sum of the results between
the Median and Laplacian filters (5). For each operation performed, we show
the Fourier transform.
fore different detection techniques were discussed. Most of the
existing detection techniques are based on neural networks and
it is very complicated to explain their results in a courtroom,
giving their black-box features. Being able to understand
the type of architecture used, the anomalous features and
deterministically explaining why an image is a Deepfake is a
process that is still almost completely absent in the literature.
In general, in the Multimedia Forensics [4] best practices
are used to determine if an image is a fake, where, one tries
to understand if it comes from a particular source, analyzing,
information present in the metadata (how much present and
not altered), the PNRU present in the images (fingerprint of
the source), analysis of the coefficients obtained by JPEG
compression, analysis in the Fourier domain and much more.
If a specific information is not present, the suspicion arises
that the data in question is not real. Nowadays, the current
neural networks that generate DeepFake do not perform the
same operations that are performed by any acquisition imaging
source. This leads to obtain images with anomalies at the pixel
level, obtaining a pattern that is not present if we consider an
image generated by any device or software (camera, scanner,
social network, etc.).
A forensics analysis was carried out on sample Deepfake
Images by means of one of the most famous image forensics
software “Amped Authenticate”10: it was employed to check
if it is possible to identify whether an image, generated by a
GAN, has anomalies, considering in particular the output of
two types of technologies: StarGAN [11] and StyleGAN [28],
briefly described Section II. In particular we analyzed JPEG
10https://ampedsoftware.com/it/authenticate/
structure of the image, we tried to infer Camera Identifica-
tion (PNRU Identification), and then analysed those images
in different color spaces (RGB, YCbCr, YUV, HSV, HLS,
XYZ, LAB, LUV, CMYK); domains (ELA, DCT Map, JPEG
Dimples Map, Blocking Artifacts, JPEG Ghosts Map, Fusion
Map, Correlation Map, PRNU Map, PRNU Tampering, LGA)
and by means of many forgery detection techniques (Clones
Blocks, Clones Keypoints (Orb and Brisk). Figure 3 shows an
overview of the results obtained and it is possible to see that in
some cases the images may show specific anomalies while in
other cases simple warnings are shown by the tool. However,
this is not enough to define with certainty if the images are
Deepfake, the only thing that could be inferred is that they are
probably not-authentic and integrity is broken.
A deep analysis was then carried out in the frequency do-
main. Indeed, useful information can be obtained by working
on Deepfake candidate” images after the Fourier transform.
In general, a simple operation of Forgery or a Deepfake
contains abnormal frequencies not present in real images. The
application of convolutive filters with the respective Fourier
spectra highlights the presence of a somewhat suspicious
pattern, not present in real data. We performed several tests,
using the Laplacian and median filters and the combination
of them in order to enhance them (Figure 4). In the Fourier
domain, as shown in Figure 4, it is possible to notice anoma-
lous frequencies that substantially represent a pattern of that
particular network used to generate fakes. This information
is useful for identifying the type of neural network used
and the areas in which that pattern is present. In Figure 4
the anomalies are clearly visible and are different for the
two samples of each different techniques. Probably these
patterns represents the way that deep neural network, and
their convolutive layers, create the image, so they could be
related to the hyper-parameters such as kernel masks employed
in each generative technique. Obviously further investigation
is needed but the conjunction of standard image forensics
techniques that arises warning of “fakeness” and the detection
of known anomalies (different for each technology) in the
Fourier domain can achieve good results in terms of Deepfake
Detection performance.
Forensics vs. anti-forensics is always an open game, and
while we are dealing with detection methods, there is al-
ready a first attempt that seeks to hide those anomalies that
were described above by introducing information, such as the
digital fingerprint of the camera, into the fake images. This
method was already proposed by Cozzolino et al. [14], in the
work called “SpoC: Spoofing Camera Fingerprints. The SpoC
authors propose a GAN-based approach capable of injecting
traces of the camera into synthetic images (thus removing
traces of the synthesis process), tricking avant-garde detectors
into believing that the image was acquired from that model,
achieving good results in a wide range of conditions.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we presented several techniques of creation and
detection of the so-called Deepfakes and the related social and
legal problems. It turns out to be very important to be able to
create new methods that can counter this phenomenon. This
can be done by analyzing details of the image in question
in the Fourier domain, where abnormal frequencies are often
present, that is not present in real images acquired from any
type of source (camera, scanner, etc.). Our future goal will be
to create an algorithm that automatically identifies this pattern,
which turns out to be quite significant to identify the presence
or absence of a Deepfake image or a synthetic image created
by existing neural networks.
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